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LIST OF PARTIES 
Helen Knudsvig, an individual, is the Petitioner herein and 
was the Defendant in the Trial Court and was Respondent in the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
Western Capital and Securities, Inc. is the Respondent in 
this action and was the Plaintiff in the Trial Court and the 
Appellant in the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL 
SECURITIES, INC. 
Respondent, 
vs. 
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Petitioner. 
AND ] > REPLY TO 
) PETITION FOR A 
> WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
i CASE NO: 890132 
(CATEGORY NO. 14) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY PETITIONER FOR REVIEW 
POINT I. Whether a violation of Federal Securities Law can 
be raised as a mandatory counterclaim in a State Court action. 
POINT II. Whether a violation of Securities Dealers Rules 
gives rise to a federal question or a state court action. 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court has been requested by the 
Petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) and 
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The decision 
of the Court of Appeals was entered on February 7, 1989, and 
Petitioner's brief was mailed to Respondent's Counsel on April 
10, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The facts as set forth in Petitioners Brief are a 
recitation of the facts as contained in her brief before the 
Court of Appeals. The facts set forth by Petitioner in 
Petitioner's Brief are incorrect and not substantiated by the 
testimony at trial. However, a lengthy recitation of the 
errors is not necessary for a determination relating to the 
present Petition. The pertinent facts are that Respondent 
filed an action in the State Courts requesting relief based on 
breach of contract. Petitioner filed a Counterclaim requesting 
relief pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Securities and Exchange Rules promulgated thereunder. 
Petitioner also requested relief pursuant to rules of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). The 
lower court denied Respondent's claim and despite a Finding 
that Petitioner had no actual damages, granted to Petitioner, 
judgment for punitive damages. The Respondent appealed the 
ruling of the lower court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of 
Respondent's claim and determined sua sponte that the trial 
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear or adjudicate any of the 
issues raised in Petitioner's Counterclaim as those claims were 
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based in total on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rules 
promulgated thereunder. The Court found that even if such 
Counterclaim was a mandatory Counterclaim, Petitioner could not 
raise a matter of violation of Federal Securities Laws in the 
State Courts. Jurisdiction of these matters is reserved 
exclusively to the Federal Courts. 
The Utah Court of Appeals also found that rules of the NASD 
were adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and therefore subject to the exclusive jurisdiction provisions 
of that Act. The Utah Court of Appeals therefore dismissed 
Petitioner's Counterclaim and reversed the judgment against 
Respondent. 
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REPLY TO ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FEDERAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS PURSUANT TO THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS 
WELL FOUNDED IN LAW AND NO REVIEW IS 
NECESSARY 
Petitioner contends that subparagraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Rule 
43 of the Rules of The Utah Supreme Court provide a basis for 
the granting of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. First/ 
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided a question 
of State or Federal law that is in conflict with the decision 
of this Court. Petitioner claims the case of Cowen and Co. v. 
Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984) is in 
conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, 
the Petitioner never states in what manner the Cowen case is in 
conflict. The Court in Cowen made no determination as to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over matters 
arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and merely-
stated what are the duties of a Securities Broker-Dealer 
pursuant to the NASD rules. The Court in Cowen did not enforce 
the NASD rules, but only referred to the rules to determine the 
responsibility of Cowen and Co. which resulted in damages 
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awarded to Cowen and Co. The Cowen case does not in any manner 
conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals in the 
present case. 
The Petitioner further indicates that the Court of Appeals 
should have remanded the matter to the trial court to find if 
relief could have been granted based on a State claim. The 
Petitioner in her Counterclaim and throughout the trial never 
raised an issue of State claims or questions, but based her 
action on Federal claims. A remand by the Court of Appeals 
would have been an error. 
Petitioner further claims that the Court of Appeals 
determined an important question in the conflict of Federal and 
State law which should be settled by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah. While the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
may not have specifically determined the issue of exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts over claims pursuant to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the issue has been determined 
by numerous other courts including the Tenth Circuit. In the 
case of deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co.. 435 F.2d 1223 (1970) at 
page 1231, the Tenth Circuit specifically stated, "All actions 
under Rule 10B-5 must be brought in the Federal Courts, 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa. . . ." Even though the present case included 
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alleged violations of Rules 10B-5 and 10B-10, the decision in 
the deHass case is applicable and squarely on point in that 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa on which the deHass court rendered its decision 
states: 
"The district courts of the United States 
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
violations of this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder. . . . Any suit or 
action to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this chapter or rules and 
regulations thereunder. . .may be brought in 
any such district or in the district wherein 
the defendant is found or is an inhabitant 
. . . • 
The question of exclusive jurisdiction is specifically set 
forth in the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934 and was 
specifically adopted by the deHass court for the Tenth Circuit 
and has been adopted by numerous other courts. (Securities 
Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F.Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
Kinsev v. Nestor Exploration Ltd.- 1981A, 604 F.Supp. 1365, 
1368-69 (E.D. Wash 1985); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F.Supp. 829, 
839 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
The Petitioner states that one of the grounds on which the 
Petition for Certiorari should be granted is that the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call 
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for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
The Defendant does not argue this particular issue. However, 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is clearly in line with 
accepted judicial pronouncements and the statutory law, and 
therefore no grounds exist for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to 
this portion of Rule 43. 
POINT II. 
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES 
DEALERS, INC. WAS CREATED PURSUANT TO THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND RULES 
PROMULGATED THEREUNDER ARE MANDATED PURSUANT 
TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND 
FEDERAL COURTS THEREFORE HAVE EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION. 
Petitioner argues that Federal Courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction and absent a federal question, jurisdiction is not 
granted in the Federal Courts. Petitioner goes on to misstate 
the Cowen and Co. case, supra. The NASD is an organization 
organized pursuant to specific statutory authorization of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Section 15A. Rules 
promulgated by the NASD are promulgated pursuant to and 
mandated by Section 15A(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. The express language of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 27, as set forth hereinabove, specifically grants 
jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States for 
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violations of "the rules and regulations thereunder* . . ." 
Therefore, by statute, Congress has specifically granted 
jurisdiction to the Federal Courts and more importantly, has 
specifically granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal 
Courts for alleged violations of such rules. 
The Petitioner again quotes the Cowen case, supra, and 
claims that this Court has previously decided this issue on 
appeal. However, the Petitioner never sets forth where in the 
Cowen case this Court made any such determination. Petitioner 
apparently mistakes the Court's quote of an NASD rule to be a 
determination by this Court that State courts have jurisdiction 
over enforcement of those rules. The Cowen case does not make 
any such holding. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled in the present case. 
The decision by the Court of Appeals is amply supported by 
statutory and case law. The decision of the Court of Appeals 
is not in conflict with the decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court. Therefore no basis exists for the granting of a Writ of 
Certiorari in this matter, and the Petition should be dismissed 
with costs awarded to the Respondent. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 1989. 
CrajrO^McCull^uyh S) —» 
Attorney for Respondent 
CDN9133m 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1989 I mailed 
four true and correct copies of the above and foregoing REPLY 
TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI by placing the same in the 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
Gerald A. Wight 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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Rule 43 of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of 
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted 
only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor 
wholly measuring the court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a 
way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court as to call for an exercise of this 
court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this court. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 15A 
REGISTERED SECURITIES ASSOCIATIONS 
SECTION 15A. (a) An association of brokers and dealers may be 
registered as a national securities association pursuant to subsection 
(b), or as an affiliated securities association pursuant to subsection 
(d), under the terms and conditions hereinafter provided in this 
section and in accordance with the provisions of section 19(a) of this 
title, by filing with the Commission an application for registration in 
such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe containing the 
rules of the association and such other information and documents as 
the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors, 
(b) An association of brokers and dealers shall not be registered 
as a national securities association unless the Commission determines 
that— 
(1) By reason of the number and geographical distribution 
of its members and the scope of their transactions, such associa-
tion will be able to carry out the purposes of this section, 
(2) Such association is so organized and has the capacity to 
be able to carry out the purposes of this title and to comply, and 
(subject to any rule or order of the Commission pursuant to 
section 17(d) or 19(g)(2) of this title) to enforce compliance by 
its members and persons associated with its members, with the 
provisions of this title, the rules and regulations thereunder, the 
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the rules 
of the association. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (g) of this sec-
tion, the rules of the association provide that any registered 
broker or-dealer may become a member of such association and 
any person may become associated with a member thereof. 
(4) The rules of the association assure a fair representation 
of its members in the selection of its directors and administration 
of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall be 
representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with 
a member of the association, broker, or dealer. 
(5) The rules of the association provide for the equitable 
allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among 
members and issuers and other persons using any facility or 
system which the association operates or controls. 
(6) The rules of the association are designed to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just 
and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and 
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, set-
tling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating 
transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect 
the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market 
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public 
interest; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination 
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, to fix minimum 
profits, to impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, 
allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged by its members, 
or to regulate by virtue of any authority conferred by this title 
matters not related to the purposes of this title or the administra-
tion of the association. 
(7) The rules of the association provide that (subject to any 
rule or order of the Commission pursuant to section 17(d) or 
19(g) (2) of this title) its members and persons associated with its 
members shall be appropriately disciplined for violation of any 
provision of this title, the rules or regulations thereunder, the 
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or the rules 
of the association, by expulsion, suspension, limitation of activi-
ties, functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or 
barred from being associated with a member, or any other fitting 
sanction. 
(8) The rules of the association are in accordance with the 
provisions of subsection (h) of this section, and, in general, 
provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and 
persons associated with members, the denial of membership to 
any person seeking membership therein, the barring of any 
person from becoming associated with a member thereof, and the 
prohibition or limitation by the association of any person with 
respect to access to services offered by the association or a 
member thereof. 
(9) The rules of the association do not impose any burden 
on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the 
purposes of this title. 
(10) The requirements of subsection (c), insofar as these 
may be applicable, are satisfied. 
(11) The rules of the association include provisions gov-
erning the form and content of quotations relating to securities 
sold otherwise than on a national securities exchange which may 
be distributed or published by any member or person associated 
with a member, and the persons to whom such quotations may be 
supplied. Such rules relating to quotations shall be designed to 
produce fair and informative quotations, to prevent fictitious or 
misleading quotations, and to promote orderly procedures for 
collecting, distributing and publishing quotations. 
(c) The Commission may permit or require the rules of an 
association applying for registration pursuant to subsection (b), to 
provide for the admission of an association registered as an affiliated 
securities association pursuant to subsection (d), to participation in 
said applicant association as an affiliate thereof, under terms permit-
ting such powers and responsibilities to such affiliate, and under such 
other 'appropriate terms and conditions, as may be provided by the 
rules of said applicant association, if such rules appear to the Commis-
sion to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors and to carry out the purposes of this section. 
The duties and powers of the Commission with respect to any national 
securities association or any affiliated association shall in no way be 
limited by reason of any such affiliation. 
(d) An applicant association shall not be registered as an affili-
ated securities association unless it appears to the Commission that— 
(1) such association, notwithstanding that it does not satisfy 
the requirements set forth in paragraph (1) of subsection (b), 
will, forthwith upon the registration thereof, be admitted to 
affiliation with an association registered as a national securities 
association pursuant to said subsection (b), in the manner and 
under the terms and conditions provided by the rules of said 
national securities association in accordance with subsection (c); 
and 
(2) such association and its rules satisfy the requirements set 
forth in paragraphs (2) to (10) inclusive and paragraph (12), of 
subsection (b); except that in the case of any such association any 
restrictions upon membership therein of the type authorized by 
paragraph (3) of subsection (D) shall not be less stringent than in 
the case or the national securities association with which such 
association is to be affiliated. 
(e)(1) The rules of a registered securities association may 
provide that no member thereof shall deal with any nonmember 
professional (as defined in paragraph (2) of this subsection) except at 
the same prices, for the same commissions or fees, and on the same 
terms and conditions as are by such member accorded to the general 
public. 
(2) For the purposes of this subsection, the term "nonmember 
professional" shall include (A) with respect to transactions in securi-
ties other than municipal securities, any registered broker or dealer 
who is not a member of any registered securities association, except 
such a broker or dealer who deals exclusively in commercial paper, 
bankers' acceptances and commercial bills, and (B) with respect to 
transactions in municipal securities, any municipal securities dealer 
(other than a bank or division or department of a bank) who is not a 
member of any registered securities association and any municipal 
securities broker who is not a member of any such association. 
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be so construed or applied as 
to prevent (A) any member of a registered securities association from 
granting to any other member of any registered securities association 
any dealer's discount, allowance, commission, or special terms, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, or (B) any member 
of a registered securities association or any municipal securities dealer 
which is a bank or a division or department of a bank from granting to 
any member of any registered securities association or any such 
municipal securities dealer any dealer's discount, allowance, commis-
sion, or special terms in connection with the purchase or sale of 
municipal securities: Provided, however, That the granting of any 
such discount, allowance, commission, or special terms in connection 
with the purchase or sale of municipal securities shall be subject to 
rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board adopted pursuant 
to section 15B(b)(2)(K) of this title. 
(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, 
nothing in this section shall be construed to apply with respect to any 
transaction by a registered broker or dealer in any exempted security. 
(2) A registered securities association may adopt and implement 
rules applicable to members of such association (A) to enforce 
compliance by registered brokers and dealers with applicable provi-
sions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder, (B) to 
provide that its members and persons associated with its members 
shall be appropriately disciplined, in accordance with subsections 
(b)(7), (b)(8), and (h) of this section, for violation of applicable 
provisions of this title and the rules and regulations thereunder, (C) 
to provide for reasonable inspection and examination of the books and 
records of registered brokers and dealers, (D) to provide for the 
matters described in paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), and (b)(5) of this 
section, (E) to implement the provisions of subsection (g) of this 
section, and (F) to prohibit fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, and 
false advertising. 
(3) Nothing in subsection (b) (6) or (b) (11) of this section shall 
be construed to permit a registered securities association to make 
rules concerning any transaction by a registered broker of dealer in a 
municipal security. 
(g) (1) A registered securities association shall deny membership 
to any person who is not a registered broker or dealer. 
(2) A registered securities association may, and in cases in which 
the Commission, by order, directs as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors shall, deny member-
ship to any registered broker or dealer, and bar from becoming 
associated with a member any person, who is subject to a statutory 
disqualification. A registered securities association shall file notice 
with the Commission not less than 30 days prior to admitting any 
registered broker or dealer to membership or permitting any person 
to oecome associated with a member, if the association knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that such broker or 
dealer or person was subject to a statutory disqualification. The notice 
shall be in such form and contain such information as the Commission, 
by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
(3) (A) A registered securities association may deny membership 
to, or condition the membership of, a registered broker or dealer if (i) 
such broker or dealer does not meet such standards of financial 
responsibility or operational capability or such broker or dealer or any 
natural person associated with such broker or dealer does not meet 
such standards of training, experience and competence as are pre-
scribed by the rules of the association or (ii) such broker or dealer or 
person associated with such broker or dealer has engaged and there is 
a reasonable likelihood he will again engage in acts or practices 
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. A registered 
securities association may examine and verify the qualifications of an 
applicant to become a member and the natural persons associated 
with such an applicant in accordance with procedures established by 
the rules of the association. 
(B) A registered securities association may bar a natural person 
from becoming associated with a member or condition the association 
of a natural person with a member if such natural person (i) does not 
meet such standards of training, experience, and competence as are 
prescribed by the rules of the association or (ii) has engaged and 
there is a reasonable likelihood he will again engage in acts or 
practices inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade. A 
registered securities association may examine and verify the qualifica-
tions of an applicant to become a person associated with a member in 
accordance with procedures established by the rules of the association 
and require a natural person associated with a member, or any class of 
such natural persons, to be registered with the association in accor-
dance with procedures so established. 
(C) A registered securities association may bar any person from 
becoming associated with a member if such person does not agree (i) 
to supply the- association with such information with respect to its 
relationship and dealings with the member as may be specified in the 
rules of the association and (ii) to permit examination of its books and 
records to verify the accuracy of any information so supplied. 
(D) Nothing in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of this paragraph 
shall oe construed to permit a registered securities association to deny 
membership to or condition the membership of, or bar any person 
from becoming associated with or condition the association of any 
person with, a broker or dealer that engages exclusively in transac-
tions in exempted securities. 
(4) (A) A registered securities association may deny membership 
to, or condition the membership of, a government securities broker or 
government securities dealer if such government securities broker or 
government securities dealer (i) does not meet standards of financial 
responsibility under rules adopted pursuant to section 15C(b) (1) (A) 
of this title, or (ii) has engaged and there is a reasonable likelihood 
that it will again engage in any conduct or practice which would 
subject such government securities broker or government securities 
dealer to sanctions under section 15C(c) of this title. A registered 
securities association may establish procedures including examination 
of the books and records of government securities brokers and gov-
ernment securities dealers to verify compliance with the provisions of 
this title and the rules thereunder. 
(B) A registered securities association may bar any person from 
becoming associated with a member or condition the association of a 
person with a member (i) if such person has engaged in any conduct 
or practice and there is a reasonable likelihood that such person will 
again engage in any conduct or practice which would subject such 
person to sanctions under section 15C(c) of this title, or (ii) if such 
person does not agree to supply such association with such informa-
tion with respect to its relationship and dealings with the member as 
may be specified in the rules of the association and to permit examina-
tion of its books and records to verify the accuracy thereof. 
(5) A registered securities association may deny membership to a 
registered broker or dealer not engaged in a type of business in which 
the rules of the association require members to be engaged: Provided, 
however, That no registered securities association may deny member-
ship to a registered broker or dealer by reason of the amount of such 
type of business done by such broker or dealer or the other types of 
business in which he is engaged. 
(h) (1) In any proceeding by a registered securities association to 
determine whether a member or person associated with a member 
should be disciplined (other than a summary proceeding pursuant to 
paragraph (3) of this subsection) the association shall bring specific 
charges, notify such member or person of, and give him an opportu-
nity to defend against, such charges, and keep a record. A determina-
tion by the association to impose a disciplinary sanction shall be 
supported by a statement setting forth— 
(A) any act or practice in which such member or person 
associated with a member has been found to have engaged, or 
which such member or person has been found to have omitted; 
(B) the specific provision of this title, the rules or regula-
tions thereunder, the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemak-
ing Board, or the rules of the association which any such act or 
practice, or omission to act, is deemed to violate; and 
(C) the sanction imposed and the reason therefor. 
(2) In any proceeding by a registered securities association to 
determine whether a person shall be denied membership, barred from 
becoming associated with a member, or prohibited or limited with 
respect to access to services offered by the association or a member 
thereof (other than a summary proceeding pursuant to paragraph (3) 
of this subsection), the association shall notify such person of and give 
him an opportunity to be heard upon, the specific grounds for denial, 
bar, or prohibition or limitation under consideration and keep a 
record. A determination by the association to deny membership, bar a 
person from becoming associated with a member, or prohibit or limit a 
person with respect to access to services offered by the association or 
a member thereof shall be supported by a statement setting forth the 
specific grounds on which the denial, bar, or prohibition or limitation 
is based. 
(3) A registered securities association may summarily (A) sus-
pend a member or person associated with a member who has been and 
is expelled or suspended from any self-regulatory organization or 
barred or suspended from being associated with a member of any self-
regulatory organization, (B) suspend a member who is in such finan-
cial or operating difficulty that the association determines and so 
notifies the Commission that the member cannot be permitted to 
continue to do business as a member with safety to investors, credi-
tors, other members, or the association, or (C) limit or prohibit any 
person with respect to access to services oflPered by the association if 
subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph is applicable to such 
person or, in the case of a person who is not a member, if the 
association determines that such person does not meet the qualifica-
tion requirements or other prerequisites for such access and such 
person cannot be permitted to continue to have such access with 
safety to investors, creditors, members, or the association. Any person 
aggrieved by any such summary action shall be promptly afforded an 
opportunity for a hearing by tne association in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection. The Commis-
sion, by order, may stay any such summary action on its own motion 
or upon application by any person aggrieved thereby, if the Commis-
sion determines summarily or after notice and opportunity for hearing 
(which hearing mav consist solely of the submission of affidavits or 
presentation or oral arguments) that such stay is consistent with the 
public interest and the protection of investors. 
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JURISDICTION OF OFFENSES AND SUITS 
SECTION 27. The district courts of the United States, the district 
court of the United States for the District of Columbia, and the United 
States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of 
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in 
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any 
criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or 
transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to 
enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and regula-
tions thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and 
regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district 
wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts 
business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district 
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant 
may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to 
review as provided in sections 128 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as 
amended (U.S.C., title 28, sees. 225 and 347). No costs shall be 
assessed for or against the Commission in any proceeding under 
this title brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such 
other courts. 
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GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff and appellant, Western Capital and Securities, 
Inc. (Western), filed an action to recover $5,402.20 damages 
incurred when defendant and respondent, Helen Knudsvig, failed 
or refused to deliver a stock certificate after she allegedly 
requested Western to sell stock for her. Knudsvig counter-
claimed, alleging that Western had violated Rules 10b-5 and 
10b-10 promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934, and various rules of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD). We affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
Western is a broker-dealer registered with the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Utah 
Securities Division. Knudsvig is a sixty-one-year-old customer 
who occasionally purchased penny stocks through Western and 
other brokerage firms. The trial court found that she was not 
a sophisticated investor and only traded a few hundred dollars 
worth of stock per year. 
The conditions in the brokers' contract between Western and 
Knudsvig required settlement of all transactions five days 
after a sale or purchase. The relevant provisions read: 
4. All transactions shall be settled by 
the fifth full business day following the 
sale or purchase . . . and at your option, 
if you shall not have received cash for 
the securities purchased for my account or 
delivery of the securities sold for my 
account, appropriately endorsed and in 
proper negotiable form, on the fifth full 
business day following the purchase or 
sale, as the case may be, you shall have 
the right, either with or without demand 
upon or notice to me, such demand or 
notice being expressly waived, to close my 
account, or any trade or transaction 
included herein on any such exchange or 
market, at public or private sale, or by 
public or private purchase, with or 
without advertising such sale or purchase, 
such advertising being hereby expressly 
waived, and such sale or purchase may be 
made in one or a series of sales or 
purchases as you may elect. 
5. You are authorized to accept from me 
oral or telephonic orders for the purchase 
or sale of securities and in consideration 
of your acceptance of this agreement, I 
hereby waive any defense that I may have 
because any such order was not in writing 
or evidenced by a memorandum in writing as 
required by the Statute of Frauds, or 
other statute. 
9. Communications of every kind referring 
in any way to my account may be sent to me 
at my address given hereon . . . and all 
communications so sent, whether by mail, 
telegraph, messenger or otherwise, shall 
be deemed given to me personally whether 
actually received by me or not. 
Kim Johnson, secretary/treasurer of Western, testified that 
this language meant that, on the fifth business day following 
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the sale or purchase, Western had the option (1) to close the 
transaction by buying in, or (2) to allow the contract to 
remain open. 
In about June 1983, Knudsvig purchased 20,000 shares of 
Venture Consolidated, Inc. (Venture) for $200 through Western. 
This offering was a new issue of penny stock for which Western 
was a market maker. Knudsvig claimed that she never received a 
stock certificate, but had attempted to obtain a duplicate 
certificate in August or September of 1983 and also in November 
of 1984. 
In July 1984, Venture shareholders approved an acquisition 
and merger with several Big 0 Tire franchises. They changed 
the name of the corporation to Tires, Inc. and approved a 20 to 
1 reverse stock split. On September 14, 1984, Louis Babcock, 
Western's Ogden representative, who was acquainted with 
Knudsvig through past dealings, notified Knudsvig that her 
Venture shares had increased in value from $.01 to $.17 per 
share, and asked her if she wanted to sell. Knudsvig 
declined. Later, excited about the rise in value of her stock, 
she unsuccessfully attempted to contact Babcock. She then 
contacted Western's office in Salt Lake City and spoke to 
Richard Davis. After a lengthy discussion, Davis concluded 
that Knudsvig wanted to sell her stock and wished to credit the 
sales commission to Babcock. While Knudsvig was still on the 
telephone, Davis contacted Richard C. Parker, Western's 
executive vice president, for instructions on how to consummate 
the transaction, which was complicated by Knudsvig's confusion, 
the lack of a stock certificate, and having to credit the 
commission to* Babcock. Parker, in spite of these difficulties, 
immediately approved the purchase from Knudsvig for $.16114 per 
share through Western's market making account. Davis returned 
to the phone, informed Knudsvig of the sale and selling price, 
and told her that she had to mail in the stock certificate. He 
informed her that it was possible for a trade to take place 
without possession of the certificate since she had ten [sic] 
days after the trade to bring in the certificate. Parker 
stated that the sale was handled in this manner because 
Knudsvig was an established, sophisticated customer who had 
paid for and delivered stock in a timely manner over a long 
period of time. 
Knudsvig disputes Davis's statements, although her 
testimony is somewhat unclear. Initially, she denied that this 
phone call ever took place, but then admitted to making the 
call. She denied that she ever requested the sale of her 
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stock. She further testified that she had no intention of 
making a sale, thought that Western could not sell her stock 
without possession of the certificate, and in 1983, Western had 
cancelled a similar sale because she could not find her stock 
certificate. The trial court found that she had assumed there 
could be no final sale until she was able to get a stock 
certificate. 
Knudsvig stated that, at this point, she was unaware that 
her stock had been sold because she never received a written 
confirmation of the sale. Western, however, stated that, 
within the five day period following the sale, it had sent a 
written confirmation to Knudsvig1s address. Western did not 
close Knudsvigfs account for seventy-five days after the 
purported sale, at which time the value of the stock had risen 
to $8.00 per share.1 Johnson testified that Western had 
waited for this unusually long period of time to cover 
Knudsvig's short position because she was a good customer, she 
had indicated that she was replacing the certificate, and 
Johnson thought that he was acting in Knudsvig's best 
interest. Western's eventual buy-in resulted in a $5,402.20 
deficit in Knudsvig's account, which is the basis for Western's 
complaint. 
In its memorandum decision, entered on October 23, 1986, 
the trial court found that Knudsvig continued to be the owner 
of the stock, that the alleged sale never occurred, and that 
Western's activity was unconscionable. The trial court 
dismissed Western's complaint and awarded punitive damages to 
Knudsvig in the amount of $10,000. 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred: (1) in 
finding that Knudsvig did not authorize the sale of her stock; 
(2) in finding that Western violated Rules 10b-5 and lOb-10 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) in finding that 
Western violated various National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) rules, and in finding that there is a private 
right of action for violation of NASD rules; and (4) in 
awarding punitive damages. 
The trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless they "are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
1. At the time of the trial, October 16, 1986, the value of 
the stock was approximately $30.00 per share. 
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.H 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); see also Cove 
View Excavating & Const. Co. v. Flvnn, 758 P.2d'474, 477: (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Factual findings are given considerable 
deference because of the trial court's ability to assess the 
witnesses1s credibility. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Power Systems, 
97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36; Southland Corp. v. Potter. 760 P.2d 
?20, 321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous.if the appellant can show that they are without 
adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). 
In carefully examining the record, we note that there is 
much conflicting evidence and inconsistent testimony, 
especially regarding Knudsvig's telephone call to Western, in 
which Knudsvig purportedly authorized the sale of her stock, 
and regarding whether or not Knudsvig received written 
confirmation of the alleged sale from Western. The trial court 
found that Knudsvig had no intention of selling her stock, that 
she was the rightful owner of the 20,000 shares of Venture 
stock, and that Western failed to establish, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that written notice of the transaction was 
mailed to Knudsvig. 
In essence, Western argues that the trial court should have 
believed its evidence rather than Knudsvig1s. However, the 
clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's 
findings that the sale was not authorized and did not take 
place, and we defer to the trial court's advantaged position in 
evaluating the witnesses's demeanor and credibility. We find 
no error in the court's rulings on this issue.2 
JURISDICTION 
Western asserts that the trial court erred in finding that 
it violated Rules 10b-5 and 10b-10 of the Securities Exchange 
2. Although Knudsvig raises affirmative defenses to Western's 
action under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-301, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b-10, and § 12 of the NASD manual, we 
do not consider them because: (1) we sustain the trial court's 
finding that no sale of the securities occurred, thus obviating 
the need for a defense to the sale, and (2) the parties -.did not 
raise the issue on appeal. 
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Act of 1934 and various NASD rules. Before we examine the 
merits of this argument, however, we raise sua sponte the issue 
of subject matter jurisdiction over this claim. -.As stated in 
Carreathers v. Carreathers, 654 P.2d 871 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), 
[t]he parties have not raised the issue of 
. . . subject matter jurisdiction . . . in 
the trial court or in this appeal. 
However, the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of 
an action without an assignment of error, 
and an appellate court may decide a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction 
where it appears on the face of the record. 
Id. at 871; see also Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). Furthermore, Mthis Court may, on its own 
motion, determine lack of jurisdiction.H Bailey v. Sound Lab, 
Inc., 694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also State v. 
Brandimart, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Haw. 1986). -Jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred upon this Court by stipulation" of the 
parties. Bailey, 649 P.2d at 1044. 
Exclusive jurisdiction over causes of action stemming from 
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is vested in 
the federal courts. The 1934 Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1981), 
states in relevant part: 
The district courts of the United States 
. . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
violations of this chapter or the rules 
and regulations thereunder. . . . Any 
suit or action to enforce any liability or 
duty created by this chapter or rules and 
regulations thereunder . . . may be 
brought in any such district or in the 
district wherein the defendant is found or 
is an inhabitant . . . . 
Federal courts generally interpret this statute to mean what it 
says: federal jurisdiction is exclusive over actions brought 
to enforce the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Securities Investor 
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 
1985); DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 
(10th Cir. 1971); Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F. Supp. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985); Kinsev v. Nestor Exploration Ltd,—1981A, 604 F. Supp. 
1365, 1368-69 (E.D. Wash. 1985); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 
880L98-CA 6 
829, 839 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Klecklev v. Hebert, 464 So. 2d 39, 
4-> (La. Ct. App. 1985) . 
There is a split in authority as to whether the 1934 Act 
can be used as an affirmative defense in state actions. Some 
jurisdictions assert that state courts do not have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate federal securities lavrquestions brought under 
the 1934 Act, even when raised as an affirmative defense. 
Instead/ they Msquarely endorseH the proposition that M[w]here 
exclusive jurisdiction exists, only the federal courts can 
provide affirmative relief." Alkoff, 611 F. Supp. at 66 
(quoting Lew v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960/ 967 (2nd Cir. 1980)). 
While recognizing that the statute precludes state court 
adjudication of direct claims based upon the violation of the 
1934 Act/ other jurisdictions allow state courts to consider 
claims based on the 1934 Act which are raised as affirmative 
defenses in state court actions. Andrea Theatres, Inc. v. 
Theatre Confections, Inc., 787 F.2d 59/ 63 (2nd Cir. 1986); 
Scope Indus, v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 576 F. 
Supp. 373/ 379 (CD. Cal. 1983); Birenbaum v. Bache & Co., 555 
S.W.2d 513/ 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). 
Even so, these jurisdictions do not allow state courts to 
grant affirmative relief to a defendant who prevails on such 
federal claims,. but# instead/ force the defendant to go to 
federal court to seek affirmative relief. Andrea Theatres, 787 
F.2d at 63. Further, these jurisdictions distinguish between 
HcaseS/M wherein state determination is precluded, and 
"questions/- which the state may adjudicate, which arise under 
the 1934 Act. Scope Indus., 576 F. Supp. at 378-79; Birenbaum, 
555 S.W.2d at 515. The Birenbaum court adopted the United 
States Supreme Court's reasoning regarding jurisdiction over 
patent claims in making this distinction: 
There is a clear distinction between a 
case and a question arising under the 
patent laws. The former arises when the 
plaintiff in his opening pleading—be it a 
bill, complaint, or declaration—sets up a 
right under the patent laws as ground for 
a recovery. Of such the state courts have 
no jurisdiction. The latter may appear in 
the plea or answer or in the testimony. 
The determination of such question is not 
beyond the competency of the state 
tribunals. 
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Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & 
Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897) (emphasis in Birenbaum^. 
The Birenbaum court found that the state court was competent to 
adjudicate a 10b-5 violation issue because it Honly appeared by 
way of defense, it is merely a question in the case, rather 
than a claim for relief.M Birenbaum, 555 S.W.2d at 515. 
Similarly, the Scope Industries court, in determining that 
the state court had jurisdiction to consider a defense based on 
the 1934 Act, also distinguished between cases, which the state 
court could not adjudicate, and questions, which the state 
court was competent to consider. It stated that whether a 
"colorable claim existed under the Exchange Act at the 
commencement of the underlying action is different in kind than 
the question of whether or not Scope violated the Exchange Act, 
as alleged in the underlying action.1* Scope Indus., 756 F. 
Supp. at 378-79. 
We do not find it necessary today to decide which of these 
lines of cases we will follow. Although Knudsvig asserted Rule 
10b-10 as an affirmative defense, her claims under the 1934 Act 
were brought in the form of a counterclaim for violation of 
Rule 10b-5 as well as Rule 10b-10. Thus, even under the more 
liberal authority, she does not qualify jurisdictionally. 
These claims are in the nature of a case rather than a question 
and, accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider them. 
VIOLATION OF NASD RUL$S 
Section 15A(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1981), requires securities 
associations, such as the NASD, to adopt disciplinary rules. 
See Emmons v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 532 
F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1982). Section 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) 
requires that M[e]very self-regulatory organization shall 
comply with the provisions of this chapter, the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and its own rules." Thus, the NASD 
comes under the regulatory provisions of the Act and is subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction provision of 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a). 
Therefore, any action based on violation of NASD rules must be 
brought in the federal courts. 
That Knudsvig1s counterclaim may be Construed to be 
compulsory under Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a) still does not confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court to hear the merits of her claim. 
"A party is not required to file a compulsory counterclaim in 
saaias-CA^ 8 
the district court if the claim exceeds the jurisdiction of 
that court." Brewer v. Bradley, 431 So. 2d 544, 545 (Ala, Civ. 
App. 1983).3 
To summarize, Knudsvig's counterclaim relies exclusively 
upon alleged violations of the 1934 Act and NASD rules, which 
are regulated under the 1934 Act, all of which come under 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Once we have determined that 
w^ have no jurisdiction over a claim, all we may do is dismiss 
the action. See In re Marriage of Passiales, 144 111. App. 3d 
629, 494 N.E.2d 541, 547, 98 111. Dec. 419 (1986); Wells v. 
Noldon, 679 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, we 
dismiss Knudsvig's entire counterclaim. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The trial court dismissed Western's complaint and, even 
though the court failed to find any actual damages stemming 
from the alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 in Knudsvig's counterclaim, it awarded punitive damages to 
Knudsvig. Since we have found that the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to hear the counterclaim, it follows that 
Knudsvig's associated request for damages fails. See Howard v. 
Miller, 108 111. App. 3d 1, 438 N.E.2d 680, 685, 63 111. Dec. 
749 (1982); see also DeWitt County Pub. Elder. Comm'n v. County 
Of DeWitt, 128 111. App. 3d 11, 469 N.E.2d 689, 694, 83 111. 
Dec. 82 (1984). Further, Ma court without jurisdiction cannot 
order affirmative relief.M Chadwick v. Pillard, 536 F. Supp. 
73, 75 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). Therefore, the trial court could not 
award punitive damages. 
3. Federal practice is similar: If a federal court has 
jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claim, it will also have 
jurisdiction over a counterclaim arising from the same action 
or occurrence. However, "if the counterclaim is entirely 
beyond the competence of the federal courts, as for example, an 
action precluded by sovereign immunity or one involving a 
purely probate matter, the court may not adjudicate it even if 
the claim would otherwise be treated as compulsory." Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure. § 1414 at 72 (1971). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN CAPITAL AND 
SECURITIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
HELEN KNUDSVIG, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO: 92290 
This matter having come before the Court for trial on 
the 16th day of October, 1986, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the 
Court having taken the matter under advisement at the close 
of testimony and oral argument, and having previously 
rendered its Memorandum Decision and entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does hereby award judgment as 
follows: 
1. That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is dismissed 
no cause of action. 
2. That the Defendant is the sole owner of the 20 
shares of Venture Consolidated which has since^ 
JUDGMENT 1 
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converted by the company to lf000 shares of Tires, Inc., and 
has been at all times and places in that the Plaintiff has 
not and does not have any claim whatsoever on said shares or 
against the Defendant. 
3. That the Plaintiff has acted in violation of Rule 
10B(5) and 10B(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and the NASD Rules of which the Plaintiff is a member and 
has further acted in a manner so as to deceive and cheat the 
public in general and the Defendant in particular by its 
involvement and hold and control over the subject corpo-
8 | | D § ration with the knowledge and inside information of its 
< CD 
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So^z such to the detriment and damage of the Defendant in at-
<5 dealings in up coming business activities, and has used all 
 fc 
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mi tempting to convert her stock, all in violation of all 
applicable rules and regulations thus entitling the Defen-
dant to judgment against the Plaintiff in the amount of 
$10,000.00 punitive damage in addition to costs of Court in 
the amount of $35.00. 
4. It is further Ordered that Interwest Transfer or 
any other entity which has previously been served with or 
notified of any restraining order restraining the obtaining 
of the certificate by the Defendant shall forthwith release 
any such certificate and issue the same to the Defendant 
upon appropriate application. 
JUDGMENT 2 no 
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DATED t h i s i^  day of QfctpbeP, 1986. 
/""\ BY THE' COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN F.//WAHLQUIST 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^ 0 day of October, 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing JUDGMENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage 
prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Craig F. McCullough 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, #528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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